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In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrast 
experimental  market  entry  decisions  where  payoffs  depend  on  skill  as  opposed  to   
combinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by those 
whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greater 
optimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that high 
levels  of  skill  are  sufficient  to  overcome  the  vagaries  of  chance.    Finally,  although  we 
observed  “excess  entry”  (i.e.,  too  many  participants  entered  markets),  this  could  not  be 
attributed to overconfidence.   
 
 
Keywords:  Skill,  chance,  overconfidence,  optimism,  competition,  risk  taking,  gender 
differences.   
JEL classification: C91, D03, D81.   3 
It is common for people to compete for access to limited resources.  Consider, for example, 
applications by researchers for grants, attempts to obtain positions in large organizations or 
public office, and decisions by potential entrepreneurs to enter new markets. These situations 
typically share four characteristics: (1) a limited number of resources can be given to only k of 
N agents where k < N; (2) each agent has to decide independently whether or not to enter the 
competition; (3) agents who enter the competition are ranked according to a criterion and the 
resources are allocated to those with the k highest ranks. The unsuccessful entrants incur 
additional costs; (4) prior to deciding, each agent receives a signal that is probabilistically 
related to his or her score on the ranking criterion. 
Perhaps the best known example of this paradigm in the economic literature is the 
work by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) who used it to model entrepreneurial entry. Their focus 
was on possible effects of overconfidence which they tested by comparing responses (i.e., 
entry decisions) between conditions where entrants were ranked at random as opposed to their 
knowledge measured by a test. Camerer and Lovallo noted higher entry rates when ranks 
were established on the basis of tests as opposed to random orderings, a result they interpreted 
as indicating overconfidence.
1 Using a similar experimental design, Moore and Cain (2007) 
varied test difficulty and found higher entry rates for easy as opposed to hard tests. 
  The  experimental  market  entry  paradigm  has  proven  to  be  a  rich  stimulus  for 
research. And yet, we contend here that the work reported to date has been limited by failing 
to illuminate the complex nature of the interaction between skill and chance in economic 
decision making.  In particular, the paradigm to date can be characterized by two extreme 
positions. In one, behavior has been investigated under purely random conditions where no 
skill is involved (as in Camerer and Lovallo’s random ranking condition). That is, skill plays 
no role in the outcomes obtained by agents.  In contrast, in the other it is relative skill that 
                                                
1  Parenthetically,  whether  Camerer  and  Lovallo’s  (1999)  results  really  demonstrate  overconfidence  can  be 
questioned (Benoît & Dubra, 2009; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2009). However, this is not the goal of the present 
paper.   4 
determines outcomes and the only uncertainties faced by agents concern the validity of the 
signal they receive about their skill and the actions of other agents. 
The  outcomes  of  naturally  occurring  markets,  however,  are  more  accurately 
characterized by mixtures of chance and skill. A potential entrepreneur, for example, should 
not only be concerned about the level of her skills relative to competitors but also the other 
uncertainties inherent in economic conditions.  What will be the demand for the new product?    
Will there be a general economic downturn?  Will there be unanticipated surprises, e.g., a 
presently unknown competitor introduces a technologically superior product?  And so on. 
Clearly, the potential effects of such random factors are important and should be modeled in 
the experimental paradigm.   
Our  goal  therefore  in  this  paper  is  to  expand  the  market  entry  paradigm  by 
investigating what happens when both chance and skill play important roles in determining 
outcomes.  Specifically, what happens when, in addition to both the probabilistic nature of the 
signal-criterion relation and uncertainty concerning the actions of others, agents learn that the 
rankings have been perturbed by an explicit random factor? A priori, one might imagine that 
increasing uncertainty would discourage agents from entering risky markets. However, could 
it be that, when skill is involved, people prefer noisier evaluation procedures?  In addition, 
how do attitudes toward noise interact with different levels of skill?    
  More generally, our research follows a long research tradition that has investigated 
risky choice in situations where outcomes depend on both skill and chance.  Starting with the 
innovative work of Cohen and his colleagues who investigated bus drivers’ attempts to make 
tight maneuvers (Cohen, Dearnaley, & Hansel, 1956), soccer players’ shots at goal (Cohen & 
Dearnaley, 1962), and success at hitting dart boards (Cohen & Hansel, 1959), this work has 
documented the difficulty people have in assessing the relative contributions of chance and 
skill in determining outcomes.  The general finding is that for events that are difficult (low   5 
probability  of success), the  introduction  of  a skill component leads to overestimating the 
probability of success, a phenomenon that has also been labeled the “illusion of control” 
(Langer, 1975; Hogarth, 1987).   
When it comes to interpreting outcomes of tasks involving both skill and chance, there 
is much evidence that people tend to attribute good outcomes to skill and bad outcomes to 
chance (Miller & Ross, 1975). This self-serving tendency can in turn lead to overconfidence 
in skill (Langer & Roth 1975; Gervais & Odean 2001).  Moreover, although arguments can be 
made  that,  for  some  tasks,  such  illusions  are  beneficial  in  that  they  encourage  proactive 
behavior  (Taylor  &  Brown,  1988),  they  are  clearly  dangerous  when  payoffs  are  large 
(Makridakis, Hogarth, & Gaba, 2009).  
At  one  level,  the  introduction  of  the  chance  component  can  be  conceptualized  as 
diminishing the validity of the signal that agents receive about their level on the criterion.  
Absent the chance component, this was already imperfect; with chance added, it becomes 
even more imperfect.  Therefore, following the results of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and 
Moore and Cain (2007), it is reasonable to hypothesize that agents will be less likely to enter 
the game as signal validity decreases, i.e., with the noise due to chance.
2 
On the other hand, consider the differential attitudes that might be exhibited by agents 
whose signals suggest that they have high and low criterion scores, respectively. Recall, first, 
that what matters is whether an agent is ranked among the first k of those who enter the 
market.  Thus, an agent whose true ability merits a place in the first k can only be hurt by   
chance (i.e., demoted below the k
th position) but not helped.  However, an agent whose true 
ability does not merit a place in the first k can only be helped by chance (i.e., promoted into 
the top k positions) but not hurt. This reasoning therefore leads to an alternative hypothesis.  
With the introduction of chance, agents who believe that they have relatively high scores on 
                                                
2 In Moore and Cain’s (2007) study, the signal validity (correlation between agents’ true and estimated scores on 
the criterion) was greater in the easy as opposed to the hard task (D. Moore, personal communication, July 
2007).   6 
the criterion will enter competition at a lower rate than in the absence of chance.  On the 
contrary, agents who believe they have low scores will enter at a higher rate when the random 
factor is increased. It is, after all, the only way they can succeed. We test these hypotheses in 
a within-participant experiment described below. 
As noted, agents need to estimate their probability of being ranked among the k best 
entrants and, yet, they only receive an imperfect signal that informs them about their absolute 
score on the criterion and not their relative ranking as such. An interesting issue therefore also 
centers  on  how  accurate  agents  are  in  estimating  both  their  criterion  scores  and  relative 
rankings as well as what might affect this.  For example, there is an extensive literature that 
demonstrates  that  people  over-  (under)estimate  their  abilities  in  hard  (easy)  tasks  and 
simultaneously under- (over)place themselves (i.e., relative to others) (Moore & Healy, 2008).  
In our work, we did not manipulate the difficulty of the task that determines the signal, and 
thus have no hypothesis concerning the effects of confidence.  On the other hand, we examine 
our data to observe whether any “excess entry” is accompanied by overconfidence. 
The role of gender has also often been highlighted as affecting differential degrees of 
confidence and attitudes toward risk. It is generally claimed, for example, that men are more 
overconfident than women (Barber & Odean, 2001) and that women are both more risk averse 
than  men  (Byrnes,  Miller,  &  Schafer,  1999)  and  less  willing  to  place  themselves  in 
competitive situations (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007).  We therefore examine our data for 
gender effects bearing these considerations in mind.  
  We tested our main hypotheses of the differential effects of chance on those with low 
and high scores on the ranking criterion in an experiment with two conditions and using a 
within-subject design to control for individual differences.  In one condition, participants were 
ranked by their skill and payoffs were fully determined by relative skill. In the other, skill 
rankings  were  adjusted  by  randomly  drawn  individual  chance  components  such  that  the   7 
relation between relative skill and payoffs was imperfect. Moreover, participants were made 
aware of this fact.           
  Our results showed that low-ability participants (i.e., those who performed relatively 
poorly on the test) entered competition more when a combination of chance and skill, rather 
than  only  skill,  determined  their  payoffs.  The  evidence  that  participants  with  high 
performance were more willing to enter competition when payoffs depend uniquely on skill is 
weaker.  The  high-ability  participants,  it  seems,  still  hoped  to  achieve  good  outcomes 
whatever the  role  of chance. Interestingly,  our data also show  that participants tended to 
attribute success to their skill, while chance was more likely to be blamed for failures.      
  Overall, there was evidence of excess entry in that mean group profit was negative in 
most rounds as more participants entered the markets than should have. At the same time, we 
also found accurate assessments of numbers of entrants, no effect of initial confidence, and an 
understanding that past experience with chance is not predictive of future outcomes.  Since 
the  outcomes  of  market  entry  decisions  in  naturally  occurring  environments  inevitably 
involve elements of both skill and luck, our results contribute to explanations of why low-skill 
participants still enter markets and, for the most part, fail. 
 
Experiment 
  Participants and sessions.  Participants were recruited through invitations sent to the 
members of the database system of the Leex laboratory of Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the 
experiment  was  conducted  on  computers  in  the  laboratory  using  the  z-Tree  software 
(Fischbacher  1999).  No  participant  took  part  in  more  than  one  session.  Upon  arrival 
participants were randomly assigned to seats. They were identified by code numbers only. 
Each participant had an individual printed copy of the instructions. Instructions also appeared 
on the screens. In addition, one experimenter read the instructions aloud. All questions were   8 
answered in private. Sessions lasted about one hour. There were six separate sessions, each 
with fifteen participants.  
  Procedure.  Participants were informed that they were being given a credit of 15€ at 
the beginning of the experiment, and that at the end, their net earnings would be added to (or 
deducted from) the 15€.  Moreover, their net earnings would depend on both their choices and 
the choices of other participants taking part in the same session. Participants were further told 
that the study was conducted anonymously and that their individual choices would not be 
known to other participants. Table 1 summarizes the experimental procedure for one of the 
experimental conditions explained in detail below.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  There  were  two  parts  to  the  experiment.  The  first  involved  ten  problems  of 
multiplying two 2-digit numbers. Participants could use a pen and scratch paper. They were 
paid 0.50€ for each correct answer and informed that the more questions they got correct, and 
the faster they were, the easier it would be for them to earn more money in the second part of 
the experiment. The ten problems appeared one by one on the screen. Participants had 30 
seconds to solve each problem. If no answer was provided within 30 seconds, the question 
was counted as “incorrect” and the next problem appeared automatically. After solving ten 
problems, participants were asked how many problems they thought they had solved correctly 
and how many of the fourteen other participants in the room they believed did better than 
them (i.e., answered more questions correctly and/or faster). At the end of the experiment, 
they were paid 0.50€ for each correct estimate. Feedback on the multiplication test was not 
given until the end of the experiment.  
  The second part of the experiment was a market entry game involving an experimental 
market with a capacity of five entrants and a total payoff to be divided among successful   9 
entrants of 25€. Each participant had to decide privately whether or not to enter.  If they 
decided to stay out, the additional payoff was zero. If they decided to enter, the payoffs were 
determined by the number of entrants and the results of the multiplication test. If the number 
of entrants was five or less, the 25€ was divided equally among the entrants. If more than five 
participants  decided  to  enter  the  competition,  all  entrants  were  ranked  according  to  the 
number of problems solved correctly in the multiplication task (time taken to complete the 
test was used to break ties). The five best entrants earned 5€ each and the others lost 10€ each.  
  Before the first entry decision was made, participants were informed that there would 
be a total of twelve similar rounds.  At the end of the experiment, four of the twelve rounds 
were chosen randomly by throwing a  die. Final payoffs for  the  market entry  game were 
determined  by  the  mean  of  individual  payoffs  in  these  four  rounds.  Participants  were 
informed in advance about how the final payoffs would be determined.  
  Before  the  first  round,  four  quiz  questions  were  administered  to  make  sure  that 
everyone understood the rules of the game. Participants were given three attempts to answer 
each  question.  Eighteen  participants  failed  to  provide  a  correct  answer  to  one  or  two 
questions.  We analyzed the data both with and without these participants and found that 
excluding these 18 participants did not change results significantly. We therefore report below 
the analyses of all data. 
  At the beginning of each round, participants were asked to forecast how many entrants 
would  enter  (including  themselves)  in  the  round.  Accurate  forecasts  were  rewarded  with 
0.50€.  Participants then decided individually whether or not to enter the competition. Post-
decision  feedback  for  each  round  included  the  number  of  entrants  and  the  participant’s 
individual payoff. After the first six and the last six rounds participants were asked to indicate 
on an 11-point scale how risky these rounds were in their opinion (0 = “not risky at all” and 
10 = “extremely risky”).   10 
  For the last six rounds, the procedure for determining the performance ranking was 
changed by including an explicit chance component. Participants were told about the changes 
in the rules of the game immediately before the block of the modified rounds. In particular, at 
the  beginning  of  each  round,  individual  random  chance  parameters  were  drawn  from  a 
uniform distribution. There were seven possible “levels of chance”: an improvement of the 
position in the original ranking by three places, two places, and one place; a worsening of the 
position in the ranking by three places, two places, and one place; and no change of the 
original position. The process of generating chance parameters was described to participants 
using the analogy of an urn containing seven balls of different colors where colors determined 
chance.  In  each  modified  round,  after  receiving  performance  feedback,  participants  were 
additionally asked to indicate on 11-point scales how lucky they thought they were in the 
round (0 = “not at all” and 10 = “extremely lucky”) and how fair they thought their payoff 
was in the round (0 = “not at all” and 10 = “extremely fair”). Finally, after the block of six 
modified rounds, participants additionally indicated on 11-point scales how fair they thought 
their result was overall in these rounds (0 = “not at all” and 10 = “extremely fair”) and what 
role, in their opinion, chance played in determining their payoffs in these six rounds (0 = 
“chance has not played any role”; and 10 = “chance has been decisive”).  
  After  all  twelve  rounds,  participants  received  feedback  on  the  number  of  correct 
answers and their total time spent on the multiplication test, indicated their age and sex, and 
answered  29  questions  of  the  internal-external(IE)-scale  questionnaire  (Rotter,  1966)  that 
purports to measure individual locus of control. Locus of control refers to the extent to which 
individuals believe that they can control events. Individuals with a high internal locus of 
control (a low score on the Rotter scale) believe that their actions mainly determine their 
future outcomes whereas those at the other extreme believe that they have little control over 
what happens to them.    11 
  Finally, a 12-faced die was then thrown to determine the four rounds to be used to 
calculate  total  payoffs  and  the  information  on  individual  total  payoffs  appeared  on  the 
participants’  screens.  Participants  were  paid  privately  one-by-one  at  the  end  of  the 
experimental session.  
  Design.  The  experimental  design  included  two  within-subject  variables  and  two 
between-subject variables. The within-subject variables were round number and whether a 
randomly  generated  chance  component  was  (chance  rounds)  or  was  not  used  (baseline 
rounds) to determine performance ranking in a given round. The between-subject variables 
were the level of chance and order of rounds. In four sessions (of eight), chance component 
was enlarged. In these sessions, the position in the original ranking could increase or decrease 
by nine, six, or three places (vs. three, two, one place in the other chance sessions). We refer 
to these sessions as the big chance condition and to the other sessions as the small chance 
condition. As to the order of rounds, baseline rounds preceded chance rounds in four sessions, 
and chance rounds preceded baseline rounds in the other four sessions. In summary, there 
were  four  between-subject  conditions:  (1)  baseline  –  small  chance,  (2)  small  chance  – 
baseline, (3) baseline – big chance, and (4) big chance – baseline.  
  Main hypotheses. The main question we pose in this study is how adding noise to 
agents’ evaluations affects their willingness to enter competitive situations. We hypothesize 
that there is a difference between the responses of low-skill and high-skill participants.  
Hypothesis 1:  Participants who score low on the test will enter the competition more 
in the chance than in the baseline condition.  
Hypothesis 2:  Participants who score high on the test will enter the competition less 
in the chance than in the baseline condition.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------   12 
  To illuminate how the random perturbation of rankings in the chance conditions would 
affect individual ranks, we ran simulations for each value of initial rank (from 1 to 15). The 
results  are  shown  in  the  upper  and  lower  parts  of  Figure  1  for  small  and  big  chance, 
respectively.  The  simulations  were  done  over  10,000  trials  and  show,  for  each  rank,  the 
distribution of ranks  that would obtain. (Ties were  resolved  randomly). Thus, with  small 
chance, someone ranked 1
st would rarely fall below the 5
th rank whereas someone ranked 5
th 
would have a good chance of losing by falling below that position. Similarly, participants 
with ranks worse than the 10
th position would rarely succeed (i.e., be better than 6
th) while 
those in the middle ranks (e.g., 6
th through 9
th) start to have chances of success that would 
have been denied in the absence of chance. With large chance, the simulations show the same 
kinds of trends except that the distributions are naturally much flatter.  
  Equilibrium predictions. Assuming risk neutrality and no private information about 
the probability of success on entry, there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria with seven 
players (47%) entering a market that has a capacity of five. Provided that players cannot 
coordinate, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each risk-neutral player (without 
private information about the probability of success on entry) enters with probability of 53%. 
This  corresponds  to  7.9  players  (out  of  15).  Detailed  calculations  are  presented  in  the 
Appendix. 
  If all players know their relative performance on the test, then only the top five players 
(33% of all potential entrants) enter. However, if players have imperfect information about 
their  test  performance,  the  equilibrium  number  of  entrants  will  be  higher  when  players 
overestimate  their  probabilities  of  success  and  lower  when  the  probability  of  success  is 
underestimated. This idea is developed further in the Appendix. 
  We  do  not  make  any  specific  assumption  about  participants’  risk  preferences  but 
control  for  it  within-subject  since  all  participants  took  part  in  both  baseline  and  chance   13 
conditions (cf., Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Moore & Cain, 2007). Our primary measure of 
interest is within-subject differences in behavior between the baseline and chance conditions. 
 
Results 
Of the 120 participants, 57 were male.  Participants were between 18 and 36 years of age, 21 
on average. Total earnings per participant were between 5.50€ and 25.90€ with a mean of 
18.23€  and  median  of  18.63€.    The  mean  number  of  correctly  solved  problems  in  the 
multiplication test was 8.1 (out of 10), the median was 9.0. There were on average nine 
entrants per round. Mean group payoff in the market entry game across all sessions was -17€.  
Figure 2 details the distribution of group payoffs. 
  The effect of chance. Our main question is whether adding the chance component to 
the evaluation procedure affected participants’ decisions to enter the competition and whether 
the effect was different for participants who scored low as opposed to high on the test. The 
data support the following main results: 
Result  1:  Low-skill  participants  enter  competition  more  when  the  outcome-
determining procedure is noisier.  
Result 2:   High-skill participants enter competition somewhat less when the outcome-
determining procedure is noisier.  
Result  3:  High-skill  participants  are  less  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  outcome-
determining procedure than low-skill participants.  
  Tables 2 and 3 report the results of several population-averaged logit analyses of the 
probability of entry.  The dependent variable was coded as 1 if the participant decided to enter 
competition  in  a  given  round  and  as  0  otherwise.  As  there  is  an  observation  for  each 
individual in each round, each individual appears in the sample 12 times (six baseline rounds   14 
and six chance rounds). Because of the multiple observations on individuals, standard errors 
were calculated accounting for the correlation across repeated observations.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of several logit specifications which capture 
the effect on entry decisions when the evaluation criterion is perturbed by chance. Table 3 
reports the estimated change in the probability of entry and the standard errors on this change 
in probability separately for high and low-skill participants. Model 1 is a specification with a 
constant; indicator variables for the chance conditions, big chance, gender; rank (indicating 
participants’ relative performance in the test); and the interaction between rank and chance. It 
additionally controls for the IE score, forecasted number of entrants, possible order effects (an 
indicator variable) and round (a series of indicator variables). The interaction term between 
rank  and  chance  is  significant  in  this  specification.
3    Figure  3,  left  panel,  presents  the 
predicted probability of entry for all participants as a function of rank, separately for the 
baseline  and  chance  conditions.  First,  the  figure  shows  that,  as  might  be  expected,  the 
probability  of  entry  is  lower  for  lower  ranked  participants.  Second,  it  shows  that  for 
participants who ranked low on the test, the probability of entry is higher in the chance as 
opposed  to  the  baseline  condition.  For  example,  for  participants  who  ranked  12
th,  the 
probability of entry was 0.40 in the baseline but 0.53 in the chance condition. Participants 
ranked higher than the median (8) do not appear to be sensitive to the presence of noise.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  The estimated changes in the probability of entry presented separately for high and 
low-skill  participants  in  Table  3  provide  further  evidence  on  how  the  impact  of  chance 
                                                
3 An analogous model without the interaction term yields a lower model fit (c
2=81.98). The difference in fit is 
statistically significant (p<0.001).  
   15 
depends on skill. We split participants by their median performance classifying them as low-
skill if they ranked 8 or worse and as high-skill otherwise. The results of these specifications 
imply that entry rates of low-skill participants are 13 percentage points higher in the chance as 
compared to the baseline condition. The effect is significantly different from zero (p<0.001). 
For  high-skill  participants,  entry  rates  are  3  percentage  points  lower  in  the  chance  as 
compared  to  baseline  condition.  The  effect,  however,  is  not  statistically  significant, 
suggesting that high-skill participants are equally willing to enter competition in the chance 
and  baseline  conditions.  The  data  are  thus  consistent  with  hypothesis  1  in  that  low-skill 
individuals entered competition more in the chance than baseline condition.  On the other 
hand, evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 is not strong in that the difference in entry behavior of 
high-skill participants, although pointing in the hypothesized direction (i.e., less entry in the 
chance than in baseline condition), was not statistically significant.   
  Parenthetically, descriptive data are consistent with the results of the logit models. On 
average, participants with the worse rankings (8
th or worse) entered the market in 2.5 baseline 
rounds and 3.3 chance rounds (both out of six). Participants with the better rankings (7
th or 
better) entered the market in, on average, 4.6 baseline rounds and 4.5 chance rounds. In short, 
chance induced the poorer but not the better performers to enter the competition more. The 
effects  of  chance,  however,  were  generally  not  positive.  Mean  losses  of  the  less  skilled 
participants (8
th or worse) were approximately the same in the baseline and chance rounds: 
3.82€ and 3.43€. The difference is not statistically significant (z = -1.35, n = 63, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test). The higher ranked participants (7
th or better) gained less in the chance than 
baseline rounds: 0.83€ vs. 2.41€ (the difference is statistically significant, p<0.001, z = 3.35,              
n = 57, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
  The second specification in Table 2 (Model 1a) includes in addition the entry decision 
made in the previous round and the payoff earned in that round. (It thus excludes the first   16 
round for which no lagged data are available).  Controlling for the lagged decision and payoff 
does  not  eliminate  the  interaction  effect  of  chance  and  rank.  (The  plot  of  predicted 
probabilities as a function of rank looks similar to that presented in Figure 3, left panel).  Both 
lagged variables are significant in this model implying that the probability of entry in a given 
round  is  higher  when  entry  occurred  in  the  previous  round  and  when  the  payoff  of  the 
previous round was larger.  
  In addition, the effect of lagged payoff differed in the baseline and chance rounds (the 
logit specifications are not presented here). Analogous models fit separately on the data from 
the baseline and chance conditions showed that in the baseline conditions, earning 1€ more in 
a given round increases the probability of entry by 4 percentage points (se = 0.007, p<0.001). 
In the chance condition, the marginal effect of lagged payoff was not significant (dy/dx = 
0.001, se = 0.004). This implies that participants correctly understood that past performance 
in the competition was less predictive of future performance in the chance as opposed to 
baseline rounds. 
  Although our experiment was designed to test the effect of chance within subjects, we 
also investigated whether the differential behavior of low- and high-skill individuals in the 
face of chance was mirrored by differences between the big and small chance conditions.   
Model 2 (Tables 2 and 3) compares entry rates of low- and high-skill participants in the big 
chance  and  small  chance  conditions  (between-subject  comparison).  Neither  the  indicator 
variable  big  chance  nor  its  interaction  with  rank  is  significant  in  this  model  (Table  2). 
Marginal effects of the indicator variable big chance (Table 3) calculated separately for low- 
and high-skill participants are not significant (p>0.05) implying that participants were not 
sensitive  to  the  levels  of  chance.  However,  the  signs  of  the  marginal  effects  are  in  the 
hypothesized direction: negative effect on entry rate for high-skill participants and positive for 
low-skill participants.    17 
  Finally,  the  specifications  presented  in  Tables  2  and  3  show  that  there  was  no 
consistent difference in the predicted probabilities of entry for participants of different gender, 
participants  who  had  different  IE-scores,  and  participants  who  forecasted  more  vs.  less 
entrants in experimental rounds.     
  Excess  entry.  The  data  reveal  “excess  entry”  in  that  there  were  between  six  and 
fourteen entrants each round (40% - 93% of all participants). (Recall market capacity was five 
entrants). Figure 4 shows the actual number of entrants in each session and the mean number 
of  entrants  predicted  by  participants  at  the  beginning  of  each  experimental  round.  As  a 
reference  point,  we  have  added  horizontal  lines  corresponding  to  the  mixed-strategy 
equilibrium prediction of 7.9 entrants (assuming risk-neutrality and no private information 
about relative performance on the test). 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
  The  decreasing  slope  of  entry  curves  in  Figure  4  suggests  some  learning  from 
performance feedback. However, the number of entrants only approached the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium of 7.9 players in some rounds. A surprising finding is the relative accuracy with 
which participants anticipated the number of entrants. There was no consistent tendency to 
over-  or  underestimate  the  number  of  entrants.  The  mean  difference  between  the  mean 
predicted and actual number of entrants was  - 0.1, and the mean absolute difference was 2.0 
persons. There was no significant difference between the baseline and chance rounds in terms 
of the magnitude of the errors.
4   
  Confidence in test performance.  Participants were better at estimating their score (i.e., 
absolute  “skill”)  than  their  rank  (i.e.,  comparative  “skill”).  Of  the  120  participants,  43 
correctly estimated their score and only 11 correctly estimated their rank. The correlation 
                                                
4 The mean difference between expected and actual entries was 0.1 persons in the baseline and -0.3 persons in 
the chance condition. The mean absolute difference between expectations and realizations was 2.1 persons in the 
baseline and 2.0 persons in the chance condition.    18 
between actual and estimated scores was 0.65 (Pearson, p<0.001, n = 120); the correlation 
between  actual  and  estimated  rank  was  0.38  (Pearson,  p<0.001,  n  =  120).  Moreover, 
estimated  score  was a  better  predictor  of  actual  rank  (i.e.,  the  criterion  relevant  to  entry 
decision)  than  estimated  rank  (Pearson  coefficient  of  -0.63,  p<0.001,  n  =  120).  Overall, 
participants’ estimates of their scores and ranks were imperfect.   
  To quantify overconfidence and underconfidence, we defined confidence about score 
as estimated score minus actual score and confidence about rank as estimated rank minus 
actual rank. Positive values indicate overconfidence, negative imply underconfidence. Of the 
120 participants, 58 were overconfident about their score and 19 were underconfident. As to 
confidence about ranks, 70 were overconfident and 39 were underconfident. Figure 5 depicts 
mean confidence for different performance levels. The upper panel shows that participants 
who solved more problems correctly on the test were less overconfident, on average, than 
those who solved less. The lower panel shows that participants who ranked among the best 
five were on average underconfident about their rank, while participants who ranked worse 
were on average overconfident.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
  Note that participants estimated their performance in the test before the market entry 
game. The decreasing slopes of the entry curve in Figure 4 suggest that these initial estimates 
were  refined  during  the  market  entry  game  as  participants  received  feedback  on  their 
performance. Indeed, as reported above, the probability of entry in a given round was higher 
when the payoff from the previous round was larger.  Thus, confidence in skill elicited before 
the market entry game can only be taken to represent an initial level of confidence rather than 
a characteristic that was stable during all experimental rounds.    19 
  In order to estimate the impact of initial confidence on entry decisions, we included 
confidence about score and confidence about rank in Model 3 (Table 2). Our interest was to 
understand whether, given the same level of  performance  in the tests, greater confidence 
implied higher probability of entry. We therefore also control for actual score and rank. The 
effects of neither confidence about score nor confidence about rank are significant in this 
specification, and the marginal effects of these variables are virtually null (not shown in the 
table). The implication is that the initial level of confidence did not affect entry decisions.
5  
  Gender  effects  in  confidence  and  entry.  Men  were  more  confident  about  their 
performance than women. Table 4 details the proportions of underconfident, overconfident, 
and well-calibrated (i.e., estimates equal to actual values) male and female participants as well 
as mean confidence within each group. While the details on confidence about test score look 
similar  for  men  and  women  (most  of  them  slightly  overestimating  their  score,  a  few 
underestimating), women who underestimate their rank do so much more than men (mean 
underestimation of 3.7 vs. 2.2 positions in the ranking).
6  There was no gender difference in 
actual ranks (means of 8 for women and men, z = 0.77, ns, n = 120, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
A linear regression model of estimated rank with an indicator female as independent variable 
and actual rank as control yielded a coefficient of 2.1 for female (robust se = 0.49, p<0.001,   
                                                
5 Initial confidence did not affect entry decision in the first round either. A logit model of entry that was fit on 
the data from the first rounds and included estimated and actual score and rank as independent variables, yielded 
no significant coefficients. Analogous models fit separately on the data from the baseline and chance rounds 
showed that participants with larger estimated scores were slightly more likely to enter the competition in the 
first baseline rounds than participants with smaller estimated scores (10 percentage points per each addition unit 
of estimated score, se = 0.06, p = 0.08, n = 60). Estimated score and rank were not significant in explaining the 
probability of entry in the first chance rounds (n = 60).  
6 Overall, the gender difference in confidence about scores was not statistically significant (z = 0.94, n = 120, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test), while the difference in confidence regarding placement in the ranking was significant 
(p<0.01, z = 2.95, n =120, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).   20 
n = 120, R
2 = 0.26) suggesting that women were indeed less confident about their rank than 
men.
7  
  As to the decision to enter competition, the specifications presented in Table 2 and the 
marginal  effects  presented  in  Table  3  fail  to  detect  any  consistently  significant  gender 
difference in entry behavior. The probability of entry was not lower for women than for men. 
If anything, women were somewhat more likely to enter competition, as suggested by the 
positive effect of the indicator variable female in these specifications.  
To investigate possible gender effects in how low- and high-skill participants behaved 
when chance was added to the evaluation procedure, we analyzed the probability of entry 
separately for men and women using specifications identical to Model 1 presented in Table 2. 
The predicted probability of entry from these gender-specific logit models is plotted in the 
middle (women) and right (men) panels of Figure 3. (See also Table A2 in the Appendix that 
details the results from the logit models).  The gender-specific predicted probabilities mirror 
the general result in that the probability of entry for low-skill female and male participants 
(higher  values  of  rank)  is  larger  in  the  chance  than  baseline  condition.  As  to  high-skill 
participants, women tend to enter less with chance than without (i.e., the interaction of rank 
and chance) while there is no apparent difference between the chance and baseline conditions 
among high-skill male participants.  
Since further splits of data (by skill, within gender) reduce sample size, we prefer 
caution in drawing inferences about the behavior of high-skill participants and thus conclude 
that, if anything, the actions of high-skill participants were only modestly affected by chance 
(as marginal effects in Table 3 indicate, first column).  
                                                
7  The  gender  gap  in  relative  confidence  echoes  the  findings  of  Niederle  and  Vesterlund  (2007).  In  their 
experiment, men and women performed equally well on a test, but women were more likely to underrate their 
relative performance: 75% of men thought they were best in their group (of four participants), while only 43% of 
women shared this belief. In Niederle and Vesterlund’s experiment, higher overconfidence among men partially 
explained why men were more willing than women to select into a competitive environment.   21 
Attributions, risk, and fairness. Participants’ answers to the post-round questions of 
how risky the rounds were indicate beliefs that baseline rounds were less risky than chance 
rounds. The median evaluation of risk (0-10 scale) was 5 for baseline rounds and 7 for chance 
rounds. The difference is statistically significant (p<0.001, z = -4.87, n = 120, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank  test).  This  result  can  be  considered  a  manipulation  check  that  participants 
understood  that  payoffs  were  more  unpredictable  in  the  chance  as  opposed  to  baseline 
condition.  
Participants also correctly indicated that chance played a bigger role in big as opposed 
to small chance sessions (where the possible impact of chance was three times smaller) – 
medians of 8 vs. 5 on a scale where 0 = “chance has not played any role” and 10 = “chance 
has been decisive” (p<0.001, z = -3.46, n = 120, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, between-subject 
comparison).   
Individuals who earned less money in the chance rounds were more likely to attribute 
the result to chance than those who earned more, as evidenced by a negative correlation 
between the mean profit that each participant earned in the chance rounds and beliefs about 
the role of chance (Spearman’s rank correlation of -0.25, p<0.01, n = 120).   
Finally, larger individual payoffs were considered as being “fairer.”  Specifically, the 
Spearman’s rank correlation between mean individual payoffs across the chance rounds and 
reported fairness (0 = “not fair at all” and 10 = “extremely fair”) was 0.66 (p<0.001, n = 120). 
 
General Discussion 
Our  experimental  innovation  augmented  the  validity  of  the  market  entry  paradigm  by 
introducing  an  explicit element  of chance  in  how  participants are  ranked.    An  analog  in 
naturally  occurring  situations  could  be,  say,  uncertainty  concerning  the  membership  of  a 
committee  deciding  on  grant  proposals  or  job  applications.  Consider  also  new  product   22 
launches. An entrepreneur might well have a good sense of her domain-specific competence 
relative to competitors, but also be aware that unknowable consumer tastes could perturb the 
market ranking of potential entrants.  Book publishing provides a further example.  An author 
can have a good track record and rank highly among peers; but this does not guarantee that a 
new novel will be accepted by the public or critics.   
  In summary, our results provide evidence of excess entry that was exacerbated when 
participants knew that chance would affect how they were ranked.  Interestingly, the effects of 
chance were moderated by how well participants scored in the evaluation procedure (i.e., the 
math test).  Consistent with our first hypothesis, participants with lower scores were more 
likely to enter the competition in the presence of chance (Result 1) but, contrary to our second 
hypothesis, the actions of higher scoring participants were only modestly affected by chance 
(Results 2 and 3).   
  Additional findings were no differences in entry decisions due to levels of chance (i.e., 
big chance versus small chance), and whereas men were more overconfident than women, 
men did not enter the competition more than women.  Contrary to the claims of Camerer and 
Lovallo (1999), we found no relation between overconfidence and excess entry. Moreover, in 
post-round questionnaire responses participants recognized that chance rounds were riskier 
than their baseline counterparts and that big chance conditions were riskier than little chance 
conditions. On the other hand, there was evidence of a self-serving bias in that participants 
who earned less money in the chance rounds were more likely to attribute their outcomes to 
chance than those who earned more. 
  We can view our main results from different perspectives. The first is simply that the 
participants  were  confused  by  the  introduction  of  the  chance  component  and  reacted  by 
responding more to what they perceived as the game implicit in the task, i.e., matching more   23 
noise  in  the  task  by  more  noise  in  their  responses.    As  noted  previously,  people  have a 
tendency to seek risk when games involve explicit components of both skill and chance.   
  The results might also be viewed from the viewpoint of Atkinson’s (1957) work on 
“need for achievement.”  The key idea here is that, when choosing between skill-related tasks 
of different difficulty levels, people motivated to achieve success as opposed to avoid failure 
tend to select tasks that are intermediate in difficulty. In other words, there is some preference 
for uncertainty in outcomes that is consistent with preferring outcomes based on skill and 
chance as opposed to skill alone. Whereas we suspect that our experimental participants are 
more likely to be motivated by achieving success than avoiding failure, we did not explicitly 
measure “need for achievement” and thus must leave testing this hypothesis to future work. 
  A problem with these two explanations is that they do not account explicitly for the 
differential increase in risk taking observed by participants who scored low as opposed to 
high on the test. Instead, we suspect that participants with low scores on the criterion realized 
that the introduction of an explicit chance element could only improve their probability of 
success and were thus willing to gamble more on entering the competition. However, this 
sensitivity did not lead to different behavior in the big as opposed to small chance condition. 
In other words, our data showed sensitivity to the introduction of chance but not to its level.
8 
At the same time, it is puzzling why those who scored well on the evaluation criterion didn’t 
reduce their risk taking activity in the presence of chance.   
  If we accept that our participants’ behavior is not fully rational, there are further ways 
of explaining the behavior of the high scoring participants. One is a belief in the “law of small 
numbers”  (Tversky  &  Kahneman  1971)  which  implies  that  the  high  scoring  participants 
didn’t  anticipate much variation in outcomes from their expected scores. This hypothesis 
could  be  tested  in  future  research  by  changing  the  nature  of  the  chance  component.  For 
                                                
8 Note, however, that whereas the baseline-luck comparison was made within subjects, our design only permitted 
a between-subjects comparison between small and big luck. It will be useful, therefore, to extend our design to 
allow for within-subject comparisons in future work.   24 
example, if instead of all participants’ rankings being perturbed, what would happen if only 
the rankings of a limited subset of participants (chosen at random) were affected?  More 
generally, there are many different ways in which chance could be introduced. For example, 
k, the number of successful entrants, could vary randomly across trials. 
Second,  more  entry  in  the  presence  of  both  skill  and  chance  is  consistent  with 
concerns about sustaining positive self-image when tested by skill-sensitive tasks (Larrick, 
1999; Koszegi, 2006).  In the case of failure, chance can be blamed for doing worse than 
expected such that positive self-image is maintained. In the case of success, self-image is 
enhanced.  Therefore,  more  entry  should  be  observed  when  skill  together  with  chance 
determines outcomes.  In fact – and as noted above – the participants who earned less money 
in our market entry game when both chance and skill determined their performance were 
more likely to attribute the result to chance. This result is also consistent with the literature on 
self-attribution bias (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
  Overall, our participants took too much risk and, as a result, their payoffs were lower 
than could have been achieved by participating less in the competition. In addition, although 
there  was  evidence  of  some  learning  through  repeated  experience,  this  did  not  eliminate 
excess entry.  At the same time, our participants seemed to understand correctly that past 
performance is less predictive of future performance when chance plays a bigger role.  
In our market entry game, confidence in own performance, measured on both absolute 
and relative levels, did not affect entry decisions.  What we observed resembled imperfect 
self-selection into the game based on skill (i.e., test performance). (For a theoretical model of 
entry illustrating such self-selection, see Hogarth & Karelaia, 2009). In addition, men were 
more confident than women in their performance (see also Lenney, 1977; Barber & Odean 
2001). And yet, men did not compete with other participants overall relatively more often 
than women contrary to findings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) that showed men entering   25 
a competitive tournament more than women for any performance level.  Why might these 
findings differ? First, although Niederle and Vesterlund also used a math test to measure 
performance and confidence, their participants took decisions in tournaments that differed 
from our experimental task.  Second, whereas decisions in our experiment were made in semi-
private cubicles, Niederle and Vesterlund’s participants were involved in a more face-to-face 
situation that could have had an impact. It is also possible that in our (mostly undergraduate) 
sample, women were, on average, used to performing academically as well as men and thus 
did not take less risk in a task related to performance.  
Our  investigation  poses  an  intriguing  puzzle.  Our  respondents  were  remarkably 
accurate at predicting the number of participants entering each round (across all conditions). 
At the same time, they only overplaced their ranking on average by one position. Why then 
did they enter markets where the most likely gain was 5€ but the cost of being wrong was 
10€?  In both the baseline and chance condition, there was excess entry in that mean profits 
were negative each round. There seemed to have been a pervasive overoptimism or “myopic 
self-focus” (Moore et al., 2007) that was only marginally affected by learning.  We suspect 
that the fact that payoffs reflected relative skill contributed to some measure of illusion of 
control (Langer, 1975). Further research should therefore investigate conditions of illusion of 
control  in  market  entry  competitions.    What  levels  of  feelings  of  skill  are  necessary  for 
participants to feel they have “control”?     
  In summary, we augmented the realism of the market entry paradigm by including an 
explicit chance component in determining payoffs and found that people take more risk when 
both skill and chance, as opposed to skill alone, determine outcomes of their actions. Our data 
support the explanation that for people who assess their own skill as low, greater uncertainty 
induces more risk taking. Although not entirely “rational,” the reason, we suggest, is not 
unreasonable. People with low skill know they cannot succeed if outcomes only depend on   26 
skill.  Chance is their only path to success even though, on average, by taking action most will 
fail.  On the other hand, people who assess their skill as high still hope that this will ensure 
good  outcomes  whatever  the  role  of  chance.  In  Alexander  Pope’s  famous  words  “Hope 
springs eternal” but it also seems that it needs (the) chance to do so.   27 
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Table 1. Summary of experimental procedure
Task 1
10 multiplication problems (0.50€ for each correct answer) 
"How many correct?"
"How many of the 14 others did better than you?"
Task 2
Market entry game
1. Quiz to check understanding 
2. First 6 rounds (no chance component) 
    For each round:
a. Forecast number of entrants (0.50€ for accurate forecasts) 
b. Decide to enter or not
 c. Feedback: number of entrants and individual payoff
3.  After first 6 rounds:
"How risky were the rounds?" 
3. Second 6 rounds (chance component) 
    For each round:
a. Forecast number of entrants (0.50€ for accurate forecasts) 
b. Decide to enter or not
c. Feedback: number of entrants and individual payoff
d. "How lucky in round?" & "How fair was payoff?" 
5. After second 6 rounds:
"How risky were the rounds?" 
"How fair were rounds overall?"
"What role of luck in payoffs?" 
Feedback on performance in Task 1 (multiplication test)
Completion of Rotter's (1966) I-E test
Participants remunerated individually
Note: The procedure is shown for the experimental condition for which there was no explicit
chance condition in the first six rounds but there was in the second six rounds.   31 
Table 2: Logit models of entry  
Constant  0.81 ( 0.56 ) -0.23 ( 0.58 ) 0.28 ( 0.59 ) 2.85 ( 1.63 )
Chance (0/1) -0.45 ( 0.30 ) -0.46 ( 0.29 ) -0.48 ( 0.30 )
Rank -0.22 ( 0.04 ) *** -0.16 ( 0.04 ) *** -0.18 ( 0.05 ) *** -0.28 ( 0.07 ) ***
Rank*Chance 0.08 ( 0.03 ) ** 0.09 ( 0.03 ) ** 0.09 ( 0.03 ) **
Big chance (0/1) -0.10 ( 0.26 ) -0.01 ( 0.23 ) -0.73 ( 0.61 ) -0.02 ( 0.23 )
Rank*Big chance 0.08 ( 0.07 )
Order (0/1) 0.31 ( 0.26 ) 0.46 ( 0.23 ) 0.25 ( 0.41 ) 0.58 ( 0.26 ) *
Female (0/1) 0.57 ( 0.27 ) 0.59 ( 0.24 ) * 0.45 ( 0.30 ) 0.52 ( 0.26 )
IE score 0.06 ( 0.03 ) 0.05 ( 0.03 ) 0.05 ( 0.04 ) 0.05 ( 0.03 )
Forecasted number of entrants  0.07 ( 0.03 ) 0.04 ( 0.03 ) 0.10 ( 0.04 ) * 0.04 ( 0.03 )
Entry in the previous round 1.08 ( 0.23 ) *** 1.07 ( 0.23 ) ***
Payoff in the previous round 0.05 ( 0.02 ) ** 0.05 ( 0.02 ) **
Confidence about rank 0.00 ( 0.04 )
Confidence about score  -0.03 ( 0.11 )
Score  -0.27 ( 0.13 ) *
Indicator variables for Rounds 2-12 Included Included Included Included
Model c
2 98.78 34.45
Number of observations  1440 1320 720 1320
Number of participants  120 120 120 120






Notes:   
Population-averaged models were fitted. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, correct for 
correlation across repeated observations on individuals. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
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Table 3: Predicted change in the probability of entry: Results from logit models 
Chance (0/1) -0.03 ( 0.04 ) 0.13 ( 0.04 ) ***
Rank -0.06 ( 0.02 ) *** 0.00 ( 0.02 ) -0.05 ( 0.02 ) ** 0.00 ( 0.02 )
Big chance (0/1) -0.04 ( 0.07 ) 0.01 ( 0.08 ) -0.02 ( 0.08 ) 0.05 ( 0.09 )
Order (0/1) 0.08 ( 0.07 ) 0.07 ( 0.08 ) 0.13 ( 0.11 ) 0.03 ( 0.14 )
Female (0/1) 0.08 ( 0.07 ) 0.12 ( 0.08 ) -0.01 ( 0.08 ) 0.17 ( 0.10 )
IE score 0.00 ( 0.01 ) 0.02 ( 0.01 ) 0.01 ( 0.01 ) 0.01 ( 0.01 )
Forecasted number of entrants  0.01 ( 0.01 ) * 0.02 ( 0.01 ) 0.01 ( 0.01 ) 0.03 ( 0.02 ) *
Indivator variables for Rounds 2-12
Model c
2 92.82 81.56 24.52 24.89
Mean predicted probability  0.80 0.49 0.77 0.55
Number of observations  684 756 342 378






 high-skill   low-skill 
Model 2 (Chance condition)
 
Notes: High-skill individuals are ranked 7 or better. Low-skill individuals are ranked 8 or worse. Population-averaged models were fitted.  
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, correct for correlation across repeated observations on individuals.  *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 33 
 








overconfident  30 1.8 28 1.7 58 1.8
underconfident  9 -1.0 10 -1.5 19 -1.3
well-calibrated  18 25 43
Total  57 0.8 63 0.5 120 0.7
Rank
overconfident  40 4.8 30 4.1 70 4.5
underconfident  12 -2.2 27 -3.7 39 -3.3
well-calibrated  5 6 11
Total  57 2.9 63 0.3 120 1.6
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Figure 4: Entry by session and round. 
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Mixed-strategy equilibrium: 7.9 entrants
 



















































































Note: Confidence about score (upper panel) = estimated score – actual score  







Appendix A: Equilibrium entry predictions. 
  Assuming risk neutrality and no private information about the probability of success 
on entry, there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria with seven players (47%) entering a 
market that has a capacity of five.  At equilibrium, participants do not expect to receive a 
larger payoff by changing their strategy, i.e., by entering if the decision was to stay out and 
staying  out  if  the  decision  was  to  enter.  In  our  game,  when  there  are  fewer  than  seven 
entrants, a participant who stayed out could have received a positive payoff by entering, and 
with more than seven entrants, a participant who entered could have avoided an expected loss 
by  staying  out.  In  particular,  the  expected  payoff  of  each  of  seven  entrants  is 







» - + .  If  there  are  eight  entrants,  the  individual  expected  payoff  is 







- » - + .    Expected  payoffs  for  all  numbers  of  entrants  are  detailed  in 
Table A1 (lower panel, first column). 
  Provided  that  players  cannot  coordinate,  there  is  a  mixed-strategy  equilibrium  in 
which each risk-neutral player (without private information about the probability of success 
on entry) enters with a probability p. The value of p is found by equating the expected payoff 
of  entry  and  the  payoff  of  staying  out  (see  also  Rapoport  et  al.,  1998): 
















































E . In this game, 
each player enters with probability p of 53%. That is, 7.9 players (out of 15) will enter on 
average each round (Table A1, lower panel, first column). 
  If all players know their relative performance on the test, then clearly only the top five 
players  (33%  of  all  potential  entrants)  will  enter.  However,  if  players  have  imperfect 
information about their test performance, it is instructive to speculate how they might take 
account of competitors when assessing relative performance. Considerable evidence suggests   40 
that people tend focus on themselves and neglect others, thereby adopting a so-called “inside 
view” (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Kruger 1999; Moore, Oesch, 
& Zietsma, 2007). Thus, imperfect information about test performance could imply biased 
subjective  estimates  of  probabilities  of  success.    For  example,  assume  that  this  bias  is 
captured by a parameter a (-1> a >1) that adjusts the probability of success on entry.  Then, a 
player’s  (biased)  expected  payoff  of  entry  when  there  are  E  entrants  (E  >  5)  is 










 + - + +
E E
a a . Table A1 provides equilibrium results for a  ≠ 0. For 
example, if a = 0.2, pure-strategy Nash equilibria occur when nine players (60%) enter the 
market, and if a = - 0.2, six players (40%) enter. In terms of mixed strategies, if a = 0.2, the 




Number of entrants  0 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4
1 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
2 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50
3 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
4 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25
5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
6 2.50 -2.50 0.00 5.00 7.50
7 0.71 -3.57 -1.43 2.86 5.00
8 -0.63 -4.38 -2.50 1.25 3.13
9 -1.67 -5.00 -3.33 0.00 1.67
10 -2.50 -5.50 -4.00 -1.00 0.50
11 -3.18 -5.91 -4.55 -1.82 -0.45
12 -3.75 -6.25 -5.00 -2.50 -1.25
13 -4.23 -6.54 -5.38 -3.08 -1.92
14 -4.64 -6.79 -5.71 -3.57 -2.50
15 -5.00 -7.00 -6.00 -4.00 -3.00
MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
Expected payoff, €
Number of entrants  0 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4
1 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00
2 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00
3 0.07 0.45 0.23 0.01 0.00
4 0.17 0.71 0.44 0.03 0.00
5 0.33 0.88 0.66 0.08 0.01
6 0.31 -0.51 0.00 0.22 0.06
7 0.13 -0.66 -0.29 0.27 0.12
8 -0.13 -0.57 -0.43 0.20 0.20
9 -0.30 -0.36 -0.38 0.00 0.21
10 -0.30 -0.17 -0.23 -0.20 0.10
11 -0.19 -0.06 -0.10 -0.28 -0.10
12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.21 -0.24
13 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.22
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.11
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02
sum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Probability of entry 0.53 0.41 0.46 0.62 0.72
Number of entrants 7.9 6.2 6.9 9.3 10.8


























Notes:   
* alpha is an adjustment coefficient of the subjective probability of success on entry.  
**=25€ if 5 or fewer enter; 25€ -10€*(E-5) if E>5 enter. 42 
 
Table A2: Logistic models of entry, by gender  
Constant  1.61 ( 0.96 ) 1.31 ( 0.78 )
Chance (0/1) -0.10 ( 0.37 ) -0.74 ( 0.42 )
Rank -0.26 ( 0.05 ) *** -0.19 ( 0.05 ) ***
Rank*Chance 0.05 ( 0.04 ) 0.10 ( 0.04 ) **
Big chance (0/1) 0.24 ( 0.33 ) -0.63 ( 0.39 )
Order (0/1) 0.09 ( 0.34 ) 0.61 ( 0.38 )
IE score 0.04 ( 0.04 ) 0.04 ( 0.05 )
Forecasted number of entrants  0.10 ( 0.04 ) * 0.02 ( 0.03 )
Indicator variables for Rounds 2-12 Included Included
Model c
2 75.1 39.5
Number of observations  684 756






Notes:   
Population-averaged models were fitted. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, correct for 
correlation across repeated observations on individuals. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
 